Boeing (BA) 787 Deemed as Flight Ready; Recommendations Made - FAA
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Boeing (NYSE: BA) is lower Wednesday amid conclusions by the Federal Aviation Administration that its 787 Dreamliner is fit to fly.
The FAA initiated an investigation last year, after batteries in the 787 were determined to be unsafe for flight, grounding the entire fleet for three months.
Improvements needed by Boeing were as follows:
3.2.1. MANUFACTURING/QUALITY BUSINESS MODEL
Early on, suppliers experienced difficulty learning to work with the new business processes, especially in handling late engineering changes from Boeing. Boeing has increased supply chain support to mitigate supply chain issues, and supplier management has improved significantly. The CSRT recommends manufacturers ensure suppliers use a closed-loop system to capture realistic program risks and complementary mitigation plans.
3.2.2. DESIGN REQUIREMENTS
Although the CSRT did not find issues with the general methods used to develop design requirements, it noted the following issues with identified causes:
• Communication of the requirements (flowdown),
• Ownership of the requirements,
• SMEs following the established design review process, and
• Inadequate design requirements because of incorrect assumptions about how systems would perform based on previous experience with a similar design.
The CSRT lessons learned for this area noted emphasis must be placed on requirements clarity and verification throughout the supply chain. In addition, the owner of the design requirement needs to be clear. The CSRT recommends that Boeing implement and advance its gated design and production processes and clarify supplier accountability.
3.2.3. INSPECTION DELEGATION
The CSRT found inspection delegation in widespread use among the suppliers. The CSRT noted many of Boeing’s suppliers have unique inspection delegation processes, some of which do not meet minimum industry standards. The CSRT recommends that Boeing require all suppliers to follow industry standards for inspection delegation including certification and recertification.
3.2.4. FAA REGULATORY OVERSIGHT
The CSRT observed that several FAA orders do not align with current practices. Specifically, the FAA orders do not—
• Encourage surveillance at critical subtier suppliers and require risk management models to allow assigning risk and surveillance requirements at integrator tier suppliers.
• Recognize the differing levels of complexity of aircraft manufacturing systems and technologies (small, relatively simple aircraft manufacturers versus large-scale, complex aircraft manufacturers with extended supply chains.)
• Describe a production approval process that focuses on aircraft complexity and critical technologies using a comprehensive risk-based plan.
• Establish engineering conformity based on a risk-based conformity inspection plan.
Recommendations were as follows:
Based on the CSRT’s observations of FAA oversight policy and guidance issues in chapter 2 of this report, the FAA CSRT team members recommend the following changes be made to FAA policy and guidance documents.
• FAA Recommendation No. 1: The FAA should revise chapters 3 and 4 of FAA Order 8120.23, Certificate Management of Production Approval Holders, to recognize new aircraft manufacturing business models and their potential impact on safety, complexity, risk, and mitigating actions.
• FAA Recommendation No. 2: The FAA should revise chapter 3 of FAA Order 8120.22, Production Approval Procedures, to recognize the changing aircraft manufacturing environment and to more fully address complex, large-scale aircraft manufacturers with extended supply chains, expectations, and production capabilities.
• FAA Recommendation No. 3: The FAA should revise FAA Order 8110.4C, Type Certification, and FAA Order 8100.15B, Organization Designation Authorization Procedures, to provide clear and consistent guidance to ensure FAA engineering conformity inspections for all projects (including ODA projects) are based on risk. The orders should require FAA (or ODA) approval of the risk-based conformity plan.
The full PDF is below:
The FAA initiated an investigation last year, after batteries in the 787 were determined to be unsafe for flight, grounding the entire fleet for three months.
Improvements needed by Boeing were as follows:
3.2.1. MANUFACTURING/QUALITY BUSINESS MODEL
Early on, suppliers experienced difficulty learning to work with the new business processes, especially in handling late engineering changes from Boeing. Boeing has increased supply chain support to mitigate supply chain issues, and supplier management has improved significantly. The CSRT recommends manufacturers ensure suppliers use a closed-loop system to capture realistic program risks and complementary mitigation plans.
3.2.2. DESIGN REQUIREMENTS
Although the CSRT did not find issues with the general methods used to develop design requirements, it noted the following issues with identified causes:
• Communication of the requirements (flowdown),
• Ownership of the requirements,
• SMEs following the established design review process, and
• Inadequate design requirements because of incorrect assumptions about how systems would perform based on previous experience with a similar design.
The CSRT lessons learned for this area noted emphasis must be placed on requirements clarity and verification throughout the supply chain. In addition, the owner of the design requirement needs to be clear. The CSRT recommends that Boeing implement and advance its gated design and production processes and clarify supplier accountability.
3.2.3. INSPECTION DELEGATION
The CSRT found inspection delegation in widespread use among the suppliers. The CSRT noted many of Boeing’s suppliers have unique inspection delegation processes, some of which do not meet minimum industry standards. The CSRT recommends that Boeing require all suppliers to follow industry standards for inspection delegation including certification and recertification.
3.2.4. FAA REGULATORY OVERSIGHT
The CSRT observed that several FAA orders do not align with current practices. Specifically, the FAA orders do not—
• Encourage surveillance at critical subtier suppliers and require risk management models to allow assigning risk and surveillance requirements at integrator tier suppliers.
• Recognize the differing levels of complexity of aircraft manufacturing systems and technologies (small, relatively simple aircraft manufacturers versus large-scale, complex aircraft manufacturers with extended supply chains.)
• Describe a production approval process that focuses on aircraft complexity and critical technologies using a comprehensive risk-based plan.
• Establish engineering conformity based on a risk-based conformity inspection plan.
Recommendations were as follows:
Based on the CSRT’s observations of FAA oversight policy and guidance issues in chapter 2 of this report, the FAA CSRT team members recommend the following changes be made to FAA policy and guidance documents.
• FAA Recommendation No. 1: The FAA should revise chapters 3 and 4 of FAA Order 8120.23, Certificate Management of Production Approval Holders, to recognize new aircraft manufacturing business models and their potential impact on safety, complexity, risk, and mitigating actions.
• FAA Recommendation No. 2: The FAA should revise chapter 3 of FAA Order 8120.22, Production Approval Procedures, to recognize the changing aircraft manufacturing environment and to more fully address complex, large-scale aircraft manufacturers with extended supply chains, expectations, and production capabilities.
• FAA Recommendation No. 3: The FAA should revise FAA Order 8110.4C, Type Certification, and FAA Order 8100.15B, Organization Designation Authorization Procedures, to provide clear and consistent guidance to ensure FAA engineering conformity inspections for all projects (including ODA projects) are based on risk. The orders should require FAA (or ODA) approval of the risk-based conformity plan.
The full PDF is below:
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